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When Ignorance is No Excuse 
 
Maria Alvarez and Clayton Littlejohn 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Ignorance and mistaken belief are often perfectly good excuses. If you didn’t know 
that arsenic had been added to the sugar you should be excused for putting what you 
did in the tea. If you mistakenly believed that the stuff in the petrol can was petrol, you 
should be excused for filling your friend’s car with Bernard’s missing gin. There are 
interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert 
obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and 
mistake exculpate.1 
 When people first think about these kinds of cases, they are sometimes 
tempted to say two things. The first is that these cases show that you are excused for 
failing to meet your obligations if you fail to meet them because you were non-
culpably ignorant of what they were. While not all ignorance or mistake will be 
exculpating, non-culpable ignorance and mistake should get you off the hook.2 The 
second is that the epistemologists are the ones who will tell us whether we are culpable 
for our ignorance or mistaken beliefs:3 the standards that determine whether we are 
culpable for our ignorance and mistaken belief are distinctively epistemic standards. 
We would not say, for example, that someone is culpable for her beliefs or her 
ignorance simply on the grounds that the agent’s epistemic imperfections explained 
why she acted badly or failed to meet her obligations. This gets things back to front. If 
                                                        
1 In many of the interesting cases, the subject isn’t ignorant because she is mistaken about the 
issue in question but because she doesn’t have an opinion about it. There might be interesting 
differences between the ways that these two kinds of epistemic imperfections exculpate. For 
helpful introductions to this issue, see Arpaly (2001) and Gardner (2007).  
2 See Gibbons (2013), Rosen (2003, 2004), Wieland (forthcoming), and Zimmerman (2008), for 
example. 
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we wanted to explain why you couldn’t be blamed for mistakenly believing that you 
were spooning sugar into the tea, we might say that someone with just your perspective 
could have reasoned just as you did and formed the same belief after having discharged 
all of her procedural epistemic obligations. If we wanted to explain why you couldn’t 
be blamed for failing to see that you were filling the tank with gin, we might say that 
you couldn’t be blamed if you couldn’t have reached a different conclusion given your 
perspective on things while meeting your procedural epistemic obligations. If there is 
no process of good reasoning that takes you from your present beliefs, apparent 
memories, perceptual experiences, and intuitions to the desired conclusions, it 
wouldn’t be fair to blame you for failing to reach these conclusions. In short, these 
cases show that a morally culpable failure to meet an obligation requires some sort of 
culpable epistemic failure. 
 We think that this conclusion is too sweeping. Our initial cases involved a 
mistake about or ignorance of some non-moral fact. On the assumption that our agents 
would not want to poison their guests or damage their friend’s car, these agents should 
probably be excused. Perhaps they should be excused, in part, because their beliefs are 
just the beliefs we would expect someone to have if they met their procedural 
epistemic obligations.4 What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but 
fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their 
ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance 
of the moral significance of the facts they have in view, should they be excused for 
failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. We think that 
not all epistemic imperfections exculpate equally. In this paper we shall argue that the 
best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility incorporate the Asymmetry Thesis, 
that is, the thesis that epistemically non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake will 
excuse in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. Ignorance and mistake are 
                                                                                                                                                   
3 For clear statements of this, see Foley (2001), Gibbons (2013), and Rosen (2004). 
4 We can think of procedural epistemic obligations as having to do with the way that one 
reasons and revises one’s beliefs. Some epistemologists have argued that even if someone 
argues carefully and in accordance with the canons of good reasoning it is possible to reason 
from justified premises to unjustified conclusions. For a discussion of the place of procedural 
epistemic obligations, see Littlejohn (2012). 
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often perfectly good excuses, but sometimes they do little to nothing to excuse our bad 
behavior. 
 
 
2. Setting the Stage 
 
Our stated aim is to defend the asymmetry thesis, the thesis that says that the 
exculpatory power of our epistemic imperfections depends, in part, upon whether our 
ignorance or mistaken belief is moral or non-moral.5 Our opponents think that a subject 
might form a reasonable or rational false belief about her obligations on the basis of 
moral ignorance or mistaken belief. If the agent were to act on this belief or from this 
ignorance and act impermissibly it would be inappropriate to blame her for her actions 
even if she failed to see what her obligations were only because of a mistaken moral 
belief or because of moral ignorance. If Ayn treats her workers as mere means to her 
ends, say, she might be aware of the demands she makes of them and of the effects that 
these demands have on their well-being without being aware that it is wrong to demand 
so much from her workers. It is an interesting question whether this failure to see the 
moral significance of the facts in view should excuse her when she exploits these poor 
souls. Depending upon the details, our opponents think that her moral ignorance might 
just get her off the hook.  
 We think the opposition is missing something important. In acting from moral 
ignorance, the subject’s actions can manifest de re unresponsiveness. We think that it 
is entirely appropriate to hold people accountable for actions that manifest this kind of 
unresponsiveness.6 We do not see why it is fairer or more plausible to hold people 
accountable for performing actions that manifest de dicto unresponsiveness, so that a 
man might be culpable for extorting money from vulnerable people if he regards that 
as immoral but not if he doesn’t. It seems strange to us that someone who cares about 
what morality values (under that description) but does not act with the appropriate 
                                                        
5 We will bracket the interesting question as to whether further kinds of normative mistake or 
ignorance exculpate. 
6 We side with Arpaly (2001) and Harman (2011). These authors conceive of de re 
responsiveness in terms of desires and beliefs, respectivel. We leave that question open. 
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concern for the things that morality values should escape moral blame. It would be as 
if morality was more concerned with our concern for its authority - for what carries the 
label ‘immoral’, than our concern for its concerns - for what is immoral. Since it would 
be perverse for morality to have such concerns, we feel confident that such concerns 
couldn’t be morality’s concerns.  
  We understand that there are reasonable grounds for doubting the basic picture 
we wish to defend in this paper, but it seems that the most troubling criticisms of the 
present approach are criticisms that support a kind of general skepticism about moral 
responsibility that our opponents in this debate don't accept. Our opponents agree that 
we can properly hold people accountable for their misdeeds, but they think that moral 
ignorance and mistake can excuse us when our actions manifest de re 
unresponsiveness so long as they are epistemically blameless. By contrast, we think 
that the best approach is one that sees de re unresponsiveness as central to culpability 
and blame.7 
  The opposition thinks that rational or non-culpable mistaken belief or 
ignorance about what to exculpates by excusing. Let’s note three important things 
about this. First, the opposition needs to help us understand what it means for these 
defective beliefs to be rational or, at the very least, non-culpably held. Second, they 
need to help us see how such ignorance exculpates. Third, they need to help us 
understand how the relevant judgments could be mistaken. 
  It is important to remember that the relevant judgments are supposed to be 
mistaken. On some views about practical obligation and responsibility, there are 
epistemic constraints on practical norms or practical reasons such that the subject who 
follows her evidence or forms a justified belief about what to do might act in ways that 
are bad but could not act in ways that are wrong.8 Consider the increasingly popular 
idea that if you justifiably judge that you ought to X, it could not be that your 
                                                        
7 It is an interesting further question what role de dicto responsiveness should play in a theory 
of culpability. For all that we argue here a subject might be culpable for acting in the belief that 
her action is wrong. 
8 See Zimmerman’s (2008) discussion of the prospectivist view of obligation, for example.  
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obligation is to do other than X.9 If we think of the justified judgment as the one 
supported by the available evidence or the one that you can hold without violating any 
of your procedural epistemic obligations, this view seems to imply that the cases that 
we would describe as cases of wrongdoing would be really be cases of justified action. 
Ignorance does not excuse, on this account, because it subverts obligation and thus 
functions as a crypto-justification. 
  We assume that these views about obligation are mistaken. The relevant 
epistemic factors don't subvert obligation, so if they have any significance for moral 
responsibility at all, it's because they help to excuse our failure to meet our obligations. 
The parties to our disagreement agree with this: obligations don't ‘shift’ as a 
consequence of our forming procedurally well-formed beliefs about what to do. Our 
disagreement is about the culpability we have for our actions when we do wrong while 
acting from moral ignorance.10 
  Our opponents often stress that the target mistaken moral judgments are 
rational, responsible, and non-culpably held. They seem to concede that it is harder to 
show that someone should be excused for acting on a culpable mistaken moral 
judgment. To clarify their conception of responsible belief it would be helpful to 
borrow an idea from Williams (1979). Think of a subject’s subjective motivational set 
as something that’s comprised of her beliefs, desires, and whatever further attitudes 
you think matter to the rationality of these beliefs and desires. Now think of the kinds 
of rational transitions involved in rational belief change. Let’s say that a subject’s 
procedural epistemic obligations are obligations to modify her attitudes in line with the 
kinds of transitions involved in rational belief change and let’s say also that a belief is 
procedurally rational if produced by such transitions from a coherent starting set. On 
this way of thinking, we cannot say that a subject’s moral judgment is culpable, 
                                                        
9 See Gibbons (2013) and Littlejohn (2012). They both accept a conditional like this one, but 
whereas Gibbons thinks that facts about your perspective determine what you can justifiably 
believe and do, we think that the reasons that bear on what to do are among the reasons that 
determine whether your beliefs about your obligations are justified. 
10 We remind readers of these points because it’s important, when working through the 
examples, that we don’t lose sight of the fact that the relevant actions will be wrong and that the 
features that make the actions wrong are known to the relevant agents (albeit, not under that 
description). 
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irresponsible, or irrational simply because the initial elements of the subjective 
motivational set didn’t include the right ones or included the wrong ones. The issue, 
then, is whether someone who has the ‘bad’ subjective motivational set can be 
culpable for her deeds even if she acts in line with beliefs about what to do that are 
procedurally epistemically rational. We think that that she can. 
 
 
3. Zimmerman on Control and Blame 
 
Zimmerman (1997, 2008) criticizes the Asymmetry Thesis on the grounds that it 
implies that we can be culpable for our actions even if we are non-culpably ignorant of 
the fact that we were obligated to do otherwise. His argument is designed to show that 
it is only possible to be culpable for an action if, at some point, the agent acts in the 
belief that her action is wrong. The argument goes as follows: 
 
(P1) Agnes did A and A was morally wrong but Agnes was ignorant of this moral 
fact simply because she didn’t believe A-ing to be wrong. 
(P2) Agnes is culpable for A-ing only if she’s culpable for the ignorance in which 
she A-ed. 
(C1) If Agnes was culpable for wrongfully A-ing, she must have been culpable for 
the ignorance in which she A-ed. 
(P3)  Agnes is culpable for something only if she is in control of it. 
(C2)  Agnes is culpable for wrongfully A-ing only if she’s in direct or indirect 
control of her ignorance. 
(P4)  But Agnes is not directly in control of her ignorance, so she could only be 
indirectly culpable for her ignorance. 
(C3)  If Agnes was in control of her ignorance and culpable for her wrongfully A-
ing, there must have been something else that she had direct control over that 
could have alleviated her ignorance. 
(P5)  There was no such thing. 
(C4)  Agnes was not culpable for having A-ed wrongfully in her ignorance. 
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The upshot is that all culpability can be traced to some case in which the subject acted 
wrongfully in the belief that her action was wrong. Knowledge of the wrong-making 
features is itself insufficient for culpability. 
  There is something to this argument. It does seem that we do not have direct 
control over whether we are ignorant of the relevant moral facts. It also seems that 
responsibility requires control. Nevertheless, it seems that a crucial premise in the 
argument is problematic.11 A defense of (P2) is needed.12 As a first stab, someone 
                                                        
11 Here we point to some reasons why (P2) is unmotivated. In later sections, we will argue that 
(P2) is implausible on a certain (common) reading: i.e., if we assume that procedural rather than 
substantive considerations determine whether a subject is culpable for her ignorance or 
mistaken belief. Some authors seem to think that a certain kind of epistemic procedural 
excellence excuses the agent when she acts in light of her beliefs. 
12 A defense of (P2) is in order because it seems a controversial assumption in an argument 
against a well-established view about responsibility. An intuitive motivation for (P2), due to 
Rik Peels, might be: ‘If Ayn engages in wrongdoing and is non-culpably ignorant of the fact 
that she wasn’t permitted to A, how could we blame her? Don’t we expect people to act from 
their propositional attitudes about what is right and what’s wrong?’ We don’t think we do. First, 
it is not a general requirement for acting well that agents make decisions in light of the 
(undefeated) reasons that apply to them and determine what they should do. A similar point 
holds for verdicts. To borrow a point from Raz (1990: 181), it is no fault in Ayn that the reason 
she never killed someone is that she never had the slightest inclination to do so or that the 
thought of doing so never crossed her mind. So long as the thought doesn’t cross her mind and 
she acts in acceptable ways, she does no wrong and we can find no fault with her, even though 
she might not be guided by thoughts about moral verdicts. Second, there is Ross’ (1930) point 
about duties and motives. Ross attacked the idea that our duty to act in certain ways is 
invariably a duty to act in this way from the motive of duty, on the grounds that this further 
requirement conflicts with the categorical nature of the original duty. If moral duties are 
categorical, they are incumbent upon us whatever our motives happen to be. The duty to keep a 
promise is binding upon agents even when they’re incapable of being moved by duty to keep 
the promise, e.g. when they cannot cultivate this particular motive. Something similar holds for 
attitudes. If we cannot settle the question whether we ought to do something, doing it might still 
be our obligation even if we couldn’t be guided by the belief that it is obligatory. None of this 
amounts to an attack on (P2), but it explains why we should not invariably expect people to be 
guided by their beliefs about their obligations. 
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might offer a defense of this principle linking Agnes’ culpability for A-ing to her 
culpability for A-ing while being in a certain state: 
 
Act-State Culpability: 
Agnes is culpable for A-ing when A-ing in state S only if she is culpable for S. 
 
Everyone should agree that this is a silly principle. Agnes isn’t culpable for being on 
planet Earth or being born after Moses’ death, but it shouldn’t follow from the fact that 
she’s not culpable for those things that she’s not culpable for A-ing. We need a more 
refined version of Act-State Culpability to get the argument moving. 
  Perhaps a better formulation would be this: 
 
Act-State Culpability 2: 
Agnes is culpable for A-ing when A-ing in state S only if she’s culpable for S 
where S is a state that is part of a root requirement of responsibility. 
 
If the relevant state were not such a requirement, then it would be hard to see how Act-
State Culpability 2 could fare better than its predecessors. Unfortunately, if we do not 
have a defense of Act-State Culpability 3, this defense of the key premise seems to beg 
the very question at issue. We deny that a belief about the moral status of A-ing is a 
root requirement of responsibility.  
 Not only does Act-State Culpability 2 fail to provide independent support for 
(P2), it also seems to be mistaken. Consider three (putative) root requirements of 
responsibility: having control over whether you A; the fact that such and such a reason 
R is the reason that explains why it is wrong to A; being aware that it is wrong to A. 
Culpability does not require knowledge or belief that these conditions are met, so we 
cannot appeal to Act-State Culpability 2 to explain why culpability would require 
either culpable ignorance or awareness of the deontic status of the relevant action. All 
sides should probably agree (if only to avoid a potentially troubling regress) that if the 
agent freely decides to A in the knowledge that A-ing is wrong, she should be blamed 
for having A’d. Notice that an agent can A in the knowledge that A-ing is wrong 
without knowing that any of the three root requirements for responsibility just listed 
are satisfied, for example, without knowing that you are aware that A-ing is wrong. 
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Thus, according to Act-State Culpability 2, knowing that you are wrong to A is not 
sufficient for culpability because you would also need to know that you knew this and 
know that you did this freely. Thus, Act-State Culpability 2 is implausible.  
 We think that someone who thinks of responsibility as having to do with de re 
unresponsiveness would also be skeptical of (P2). They wouldn't see why it should 
matter to evaluating the quality of the agent’s will whether she represents her actions 
as being impermissible. If it didn't matter to responsibility whether she represented her 
actions in this way, it is hard to see why it should matter to responsibility whether she 
had direct control over whether she believed or knew the moral status of her actions. 
We also think that people who think of responsibility as having to do with de dicto 
unresponsiveness should be skeptical of (P2). Suppose you were in the habit of writing 
down the day’s tasks over breakfast. Your guardian angel decided to check your list 
one morning. She informs you that you really are obligated to do all but one of the ten 
things on your list and that you are obligated to refrain from doing one of the things on 
the list. In hearing this, you realize that your grounds for believing that you ought to do 
each of the things on the list are all equally strong and that your grounds for believing 
that you made a mistake are even stronger.13 In light of this, you suspend judgment on 
whether you ought to do the first thing, ought to do the second thing, ought to do the 
third thing, etc. so that you no longer believe of any item on the list that you are 
obligated to do that thing. Your angel helpfully offers to reveal to you what you are 
obligated to do and what you are obligated to refrain from doing, but you decline the 
offer and then complete the ten tasks you set for yourself. 
 Because you suspended judgment while completing your list, you did not 
believe of any particular action that it was prohibited. You could have easily remedied 
                                                        
13 The subject might still have some high degree of confidence that each task was required and 
some low degree of confidence that each task was prohibited. We note that the view in question 
states that the subject could only be blamed for completing the items on the list if either (a) the 
subject acted impermissibly in the belief that she was doing something impermissible or (b) the 
subject’s ignorance was itself the result of a case of clear-eyed akrasia. Neither condition is met 
in this case because there is no reason to think that the agent’s decision to decline the angel’s 
offer was itself a case of clear-eyed akrasia. We agree that the subject is culpable for failing to 
let the angel remedy the agent’s ignorance, but this is why we’re skeptical of (P2) as 
Zimmerman understands it. 
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your ignorance but you decided not to.14 According to the line of argument just 
sketched, you could only be culpable for acting in this ignorance if you were culpable 
for the ignorance in which you acted. We would expect that the people who favor a 
view on which responsibility is a matter of de dicto unresponsiveness would say that 
you were culpable for your ignorance, but Zimmerman’s argument rules out this 
response. You could only be culpable for your ignorance if the story contained 
something it did not. At some point in the story, you would have to knowingly engage 
in wrongdoing, but the story included no such belief.15 While we do not love views on 
                                                        
14 In response to this, Rik Peels reasonably asked why the agent would perform the actions 
given that the motivation was now gone. We would say that the suspended judgment removed 
only one potential motive for completing the day’s tasks. It might be that there were further 
non-moral reasons for completing the list, so we shouldn’t assume that the motivation for 
completing the list was gone, only that the agent didn’t complete the list in the belief that the 
listed items were morally mandatory.  
15 Guerrero (2007) argues (rightly, we think) that a problem for (P2) can be found by focusing 
on cases in which the subject is non-culpably uncertain about her obligation but culpable for her 
action when she acts in spite of suffering from this uncertainty. We think that there is a real 
problem for Zimmerman (and Rosen who seems to offer arguments nearly identical to 
Zimmerman’s) precisely because the subject who declines the offer seems obviously culpable 
for her ignorance even though there is no point in the story in which the subject judges that she 
ought to take the available means for remedying her ignorance. Someone like Rosen might well 
say that she had an obligation to take the angel’s offer but we see two problems on this front. 
First, even if Rosen is right about the obligation she has to remedy the ignorance, it does not 
follow that the failure to fulfill this obligation is culpable. Thus, if someone like Rosen wishes 
to explain why the purported counterexample fails by arguing that the subject is culpable for her 
ignorance, they need to tell a further story about why this is a culpable failure to fulfill an 
obligation and not merely a failure to fulfill an obligation. Couldn’t the subject be excused for 
her failure? Second, it might seem outrageous to suggest that she should be excused for this 
failure, but this misses an important point. Like Zimmerman, Rosen thinks culpability for acting 
in ignorance requires that there is a point at which the subject acts impermissibly in the belief 
that they are acting impermissibly. Our agent forms no beliefs while believing that she should 
not and performs no actions while believing that she should not. If she is culpable for her 
beliefs, this has to be because some sort of de re unresponsiveness is the root of epistemic 
responsibility. We think that is plausible, but anyone who opts for this view of epistemic 
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which de dicto responsiveness is the key to responsibility, we can see the attraction of 
saying that someone would be culpable for turning down the information the guardian 
angel offered when she had no reason to turn it down.16 Such a decision, it would 
seem, would manifest a kind of de dicto unresponsiveness that seems to do a decent 
job of accounting for the intuition that the subject shirked her responsibility and should 
be blamed for it. It is probably worth noting that the intuition seems to get stronger the 
more mistakes the angel promises to point out. Fiddling with the numbers, however, 
does not introduce the thing that Zimmerman would need to vindicate the intuitions 
that the subject should be blamed for acting in her state of ignorance and should be 
blamed for failing to do the thing that would have remedied this ignorance.  
 As we see things, a crucial premise in Zimmerman’s argument is unmotivated. 
We do not see any good reason to accept that Agnes’ culpability for her actions turns 
on whether she would be culpable for the ignorance in which she acts. Even if Agnes 
is not culpable for failing to form correct beliefs about the moral significance of the 
facts she knows it still seems she might be culpable for failing to act as if these facts 
were morally significant.  
 
 
4. Rosen on Fairness and Blame 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
responsibility has to explain where Zimmerman’s argument goes wrong when applied to 
epistemic responsibility and culpable ignorance. If de re unresponsiveness is the key to 
understanding culpability for belief, their arguments must fail when applied to belief. In seeing 
that they fail, we might rightly be skeptical of their arguments concerning culpable action. 
16 Rik Peels remarks, rightly, that Zimmerman would also have to say that the subject is 
blameless if she suspended judgment on whether she should turn down the information of the 
guardian angel and that seems less plausible. We happen to think that the best versions of the 
views that place de dicto responsiveness at the center of moral responsibility would have some 
requirement that agents take due diligence to determine what their obligation would be. Thus, 
we think that regardless of whether we take de dicto or de re responsiveness to be central we 
should agree that a subject can be culpable for the failure to improve her epistemic position 
even if this failure does not result from some case of clear-eyed akrasia.  
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Zimmerman’s argument might rest on premises that are more controversial than 
needed to defend his view. Let’s consider a slightly different rationale for that view. 
Consider Agnes just before she acts and then as she’s acting. If she judges mistakenly 
that she should A and the mistake is based on a prior non-culpable mistake about the 
facts, we agree that it wouldn’t be right to blame her. Suppose, however, that Agnes’ 
mistaken moral belief about what she should do derives from a further mistaken moral 
belief. And suppose that she has met all of her procedural epistemic obligations in 
judging that she should A. Consider two questions: 
 
The Epistemic Culpability Question: If we stipulate that Agnes has met her 
procedural epistemic obligations and so differs from someone whose moral 
judgments constitute knowledge simply because of a difference in their 
respective subjective motivational sets, couldn’t Agnes be blameless in her 
mistaken moral belief? 
 
The Practical Culpability Question: If we stipulate that Agnes’ guiding moral 
belief is epistemically blameless, wouldn’t she be morally blameless for acting 
on it? 
 
Rosen believes that the answer to the Epistemic Culpability Question is obviously 
‘Yes’. Suppose that Agnes’ guiding moral belief is epistemically blameless. Shouldn’t 
we then say that she is morally blameless for doing what she did? Rosen thinks that the 
answer to the Practical Culpability Question is also ‘Yes’. 
  Rosen thinks that when we distinguish these questions and think about them 
carefully focusing on the point at which Agnes has settled the moral question, we will 
have to agree that she is no more morally blameworthy for her action than she is 
epistemically blameworthy for her belief. Given that everyone seems to agree that she 
is blameless for her belief, he expects that we will now see that blame is governed by a 
fairness norm: 
 
The Fair Blame Thesis: It is unfair to blame someone for doing something if 
he blamelessly believes that there is no compelling moral reason not to do it. 
(2003: 74) 
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Unless there is some way for the subject to work out given the resources available to 
her that she shouldn’t do what she judges she should do, we have to agree that moral 
ignorance and mistake exculpate. Without some procedural epistemic failure to point 
to, it is hard to see how we could blame Agnes for her beliefs. And if we think that she 
cannot be blamed for her beliefs, it does seem that we should not then blame her for 
putting those beliefs into action.  
We worry, though, that we can get caught in two minds here precisely because 
we might try to answer the Epistemic Culpability Question while thinking about a 
broadly procedural notion of epistemic rationality and then try to answer the Practical 
Culpability Question by thinking about epistemic rationality in more substantive 
terms.17 Maybe we should be careful in answering the Culpability Epistemic Question, 
reflecting on whether our answer varies depending upon whether we are thinking of 
epistemic rationality in purely procedural terms. We should also think about whether 
our answer to the Practical Culpability Question might vary depending upon what 
notion of rationality we have in mind. Once we notice the danger of running these 
different conceptions of epistemic rationality together, we need to ask which of these 
notions of rationality is more closely connected to culpability.  
 We can see that these worries are not idle if we think about fairness and 
culpability in other domains. Let’s consider two: 
 
The Fair Legal Culpability Thesis: It is unfair to legally blame someone for 
doing something if he blamelessly believes that there is no compelling legal 
reason not to do it. 
 
The Fair Epistemic Culpability Thesis: It is unfair to epistemically blame 
someone for believing something if he blamelessly believes that there is no 
compelling epistemic reason not to believe it. 
 
In choosing these two, we have chosen sources of reasons and norms where, arguably, 
forming procedurally rational beliefs about how we should respond to the situation 
                                                        
17 For a discussion of the distinction see Hooker and Streumer (2004).  
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does not guarantee that we have conformed to these norms and met our obligations, in 
order to see whether it would be plausible to say that a procedurally rational belief 
about how we should respond would be exculpating. 
 The first thesis does not seem obviously true. If someone took due care and 
then broke the law in full awareness of the relevant facts because of ignorance or 
mistake about the law, it is not obvious that the law should give a full excuse. (Equally, 
it is unclear that a system would be unfair simply because it treated ignorance of law 
differently from ignorance of fact.) After all, it is important to use sanctions to 
encourage people to take extra steps to inform themselves about the law before acting. 
It is not obviously unfair to have a system that would not recognize mistake about the 
law or ignorance of the law as excuses. Someone could say in response that the law 
differs from morality in important ways, but we don’t see anything inherently unfair in 
a social practice of holding people morally responsible in ways that deviate from the 
Fair Blame Thesis as a way of creating an incentive for people to take extra steps to see 
to it that their actions don’t violate moral standards. Perhaps the Fair Blame Thesis is 
too weak and more forgiving than a practice that is not inherently unfair and that 
involves some attractive features a more forgiving practice would lack.18  
  The second thesis does not seem obviously true, either. Consider the 
relationship between (a) failures to meet procedural epistemic obligations and (b) the 
judgments about first-order failures that we would form if we met our procedural 
epistemic obligations while working from our subjective motivational set. Couldn’t 
there be failures of mesh? We cannot think of any reason to suppose that the attitudes 
that we form in breach of our procedural epistemic obligations are ones that we could 
or would identify if we tried to identify them. And we cannot think of any reason to 
suppose that, if we tried to form attitudes about the first-order attitudes that we ought 
to have, the second-order judgments about our first-order attitudes would have to be 
reliably correct. Someone might blamelessly but falsely believe that there is no 
compelling reason not to believe p even when such a compelling reason exists and the 
subject is aware of it. (Of course, the subject would not be aware that this reason is 
                                                        
18 As David Owens and Rik Peels remind us, there are important differences between the law 
and morality that concern societal considerations about whether to blame, but our point is 
simply about the necessary conditions for it to be fair to blame.  
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such a reason.) It is not at all clear why the second-order belief excuses the first-order 
belief if the first-order belief is not supported by the evidence, held against the 
evidence, or resulted from some careless reasoning.19 Why would the presence of 
second-order belief shield the subject from blame or criticism on account of her 
unfortunate first-order beliefs? 
  The Fair Blame thesis might differ from these other theses, but it is not 
obvious that Rosen’s Fair Blame Thesis can do the work he wants it to. To overcome 
initial skepticism, he needs to explain why we should think that being epistemically 
non-culpable in forming a belief ensures that the subject would be morally non-
culpable for acting on this belief. The standards we use for assessing beliefs and 
actions differ. It is not implausible to think that the standards we use to determine 
culpability will differ depending upon the standard at issue. If Rosen can offer us 
something that could address this kind of skepticism, he will give us grounds for a kind 
of bridge principle. This principle can be used to argue in two directions. Any 
argument for the conditional claim that we cannot blame people for acting on 
blameless moral beliefs is, inter alia, an argument that we can blame people for 
forming moral beliefs that they would be blamed for acting on. Why shouldn’t we turn 
the Fair Blame Thesis on its head? If Rosen is really right that anything that can excuse 
a mistaken moral belief is something that would excuse actions that manifest de re 
unresponsiveness, perhaps this is an indication that sometimes nothing excuses the 
action or belief. 
                                                        
19 To give but one example, consider the consistency norm for belief (i.e., a norm that says that 
we are required to avoid having inconsistent sets of beliefs) and an evidential norm for belief 
(i.e., a norm that says that we are required to have those beliefs that receive sufficient support 
from the evidence). It seems that these norms can pull us in different directions. It seems easy 
enough to imagine subjects who, in isolation, come to have different views about which of these 
norms is genuine. Perhaps Ayn could come to believe the consistency norm having met her 
procedural epistemic obligations and Agnes could come to believe the evidential norm having 
done the same. This, in turn, would result in situations where one of these subjects would be 
likely to form false beliefs about what she had reason to believe, but whichever norm is genuine 
should settle what reasons there were for these subjects to believe or refrain quite apart from 
their attitudes about which norm was genuine. 
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  It should be noted that Rosen’s account is very generous in terms of the 
excusing conditions it offers. The Fair Epistemic Culpability Thesis implies that we are 
almost never culpable in our beliefs. We can get at this result in two ways. First, he 
seems to agree with Zimmerman that ignorant wrongdoing is never a locus of original 
responsibility and the grounds for thinking this for action are grounds for thinking this 
for belief. We rarely, if ever, form bad beliefs as a result of some prior wrong that we 
acknowledged as wrong when we committed it. Second, if we apply Rosen’s test 
within the epistemic domain, we will find that a subject’s failure to discern her 
epistemic failings can render blameless the beliefs that would have to be culpably held 
for the agent to be morally culpable in her actions. A subject who reasons fallaciously 
(e.g., commits the gambler’s fallacy or conjunction fallacy) will be expected to fail to 
see that there is a compelling epistemic reason for her to abandon her fallaciously 
formed beliefs. It is hard to see, given Rosen’s restrictions, how we could hold people 
responsible for the beliefs they form by means of fallacious reasoning since many of 
the higher-order beliefs about epistemic reasons and requirements will be blamelessly 
held. If we think about Agnes who thinks that there is no compelling epistemic reason 
not to think that it’s now much more likely that she will win after the next spin of the 
roulette wheel, it looks as if Rosen’s account tells us that she cannot be blamed for her 
belief.20  
 If we want to avoid giving out too many excuses for bad beliefs, we will want 
to drop the requirement that a subject can only be held responsible for her beliefs when 
there is a point at which she forms a belief she believes she should not hold. We will 
want to say that the failure to meet her procedural epistemic obligations, acknowledged 
or not, is something she can be held responsible for. And once we do that, we will have 
to opt for a kind of de re responsiveness approach to epistemic culpability. Once that is 
done, though, the question as to why we should be fixated on procedural epistemic 
obligations becomes pressing. If being held responsible for my beliefs can involve a 
failure to meet an epistemic obligation that is not some merely procedural epistemic 
                                                        
20 Of course, Rosen can try to point to past cases of wrongful actions that result in the 
acquisition of intellectual vices or irrational beliefs, but it seems that this approach will never 
get the scope right: cases of clear-eyed akratic action that result in these epistemic 
imperfections are relatively rare. 
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obligation, why couldn’t we say something similar about the responsibility for our 
actions?  
 
 
5. A Remaining Challenge 
 
We mentioned earlier that there were two very different positions about the 
relationship between normative ignorance and culpability. First, there is the view that 
normative ignorance or mistake remove or diminish moral culpability because they 
play a role in determining the moral obligations under which the subject finds herself. 
Second, there is the view that normative ignorance or mistake do not affect the moral 
obligations under which a subject finds herself but they can nonetheless remove or 
diminish culpability by exculpating the subject, and they do so unless the normative 
ignorance or mistake are the result of some culpable antecedent act of the agent’s. We 
have examined two motivations for the second view and have found them 
unconvincing. Against those positions, there is the more controversial view, defended 
e.g. by Elizabeth Harman, that moral ignorance or mistake do not generally remove or 
diminish culpability: 
 
We are morally obligated to believe the moral truths relevant to our actions 
(and thus not to believe false moral claims relevant to our actions), and we are 
often blameworthy for failing to meet these moral obligations, even if we have 
not been guilty of mismanagement of our beliefs, and even if our ignorance is 
not motivated. 
Wrong actions that result from false moral beliefs are not thereby blameless; 
indeed, they may be loci of original responsibility. While both the beliefs and 
the actions are blameworthy, the actions are not blameworthy because the 
beliefs are blameworthy. Rather, the actions and the beliefs are blameworthy 
for similar reasons. (2011: 459) 
 
We share Harman’s skepticism that epistemic mistakes or ignorance about moral truths 
are typically blameless and hence exculpating. But here we want to focus on a 
presupposition that underlies arguments for our opponent’s view, as well as a possible 
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objection to ours, that concerns rationality and epistemic culpability. The 
presupposition can be brought into view by reflecting on the objection. Consider the 
Enkratic Principle: 
 
EP. If it is reasonable or rational to judge that you should X, it is reasonable or 
rational to X in accordance with your judgment.21 
 
This principle tells us that there is a principled connection between the rational status 
of a belief about what to do and the rational status of the actions that the belief 
rationalizes. Once we settle that a conscientious person has reasonably judged that she 
should act in a certain way, writers like Rosen insist that we lose the grounds for 
blaming them for so acting. The principle itself does not tell us whether we should see 
the standards of rational or reasonable action as constraints on the standards for 
reasonable belief or whether we should use some independent conception of reasonable 
belief (e.g., belief that is formed as a result of meeting your procedural epistemic 
obligations) to tell us what it is to act reasonably. But many writers seem to think that 
the reason that this principled connection holds is precisely that the epistemic 
constrains the practical.22 As these philosophers see things, there is some independent 
conception of rational or reasonable belief, say, that it is supported by the evidence, 
and holding such a belief ensures that the things that it rationalizes (e.g., further 
beliefs, affective responses, decisions or actions) also count as reasonable. This is not 
because such beliefs infallibly direct us in such a way that we always hit some 
                                                        
21 See Broome (2013). Some of the principle’s defenders assume that it should be understood in 
a top-down way. Foley (2001), for example, thinks that ordinary epistemic standards determine 
whether a belief is reasonable or rational and argues that certain actions count as reasonable or 
rational because the agent performed them in the belief that these actions were appropriate. 
22 It can do so in two ways. Some use the principle to argue that a subject’s perspective or 
evidence determines what she should do, defending views on which a subject’s reasonable 
beliefs about what to do cannot lead them astray. Others use the principle more modestly and 
argue that a subject’s perspective or evidence matters only to judgments about her responsibility 
for failing to meet practical obligations that are determined, in part, by matters that might be 
beyond the subject’s ken. For discussions, see Foley (2001) and Gibbons (2013). An exception 
to the consensus is Arpaly (2000). 
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independent target, but because such targets turn out not to have any direct bearing on 
what is reasonable or rational to do. This ‘top-down’ approach is not required by the 
Enkratic Principle though it is popular among those who are attracted to it. 
 We find hints of this top-down approach in Rosen’s discussion. Rosen 
describes the case of Bill, who deliberates about whether to tell his wife a self-serving 
lie when ‘all things considered Bill should tell the truth and face the music’ (2004, 
304). Bill knows that self-serving lies are morally wrong but ‘he has been badly taught 
… through no fault of his own’ about the significance of moral considerations and, on 
the basis of his false beliefs about the importance of morality, he reaches the verdict: 
‘All things considered, I should lie’. Rosen notes that Bill has been ‘as thoughtful and 
reflective and curious as a person should be in the circumstances’ (2004: 305). Surely, 
one might conclude, in these circumstances it is reasonable or rational for Bill to judge 
that he should lie and so, according to EP, it is therefore reasonable or rational for him 
to lie. 
 This seems to land us into trouble. For in holding that, contrary to what Rosen 
says, Bill would be blameworthy for telling the lie in those circumstances, we are 
committed to the seemingly unfortunate view that an agent can legitimately be morally 
criticized for doing what was rational or reasonable for him to do (see e.g. Rosen, 
2003: 74-75). While it is unclear what precisely people mean when they say that 
someone acted reasonably, a plausible interpretation is that they either acted with 
justification or should not be blamed for the failure to do so. Either way, it seems that 
the judgment that Bill’s actions were reasonable seems in tension with the view that 
he’s not morally excused.  
 The conclusion that our view has such an undesirable consequence, however, 
depends on the assumption that Bill’s judgment about what to do was rational. But 
why should we think this? This is not something the Enkratic Principle forces us to 
say. If we accepted that principle, we only have to say that reasonable beliefs about 
what to do and reasonable actions ‘sway together’. Those who insist that Bill’s actions 
were reasonable are relying on the presupposition about rationality mentioned above, 
namely that rationality is always and everywhere a matter of procedure. But, couldn’t 
Bill’s failure to discern the weight of competing reasons or perceive the force of some 
fact itself be a kind of irrationality? Couldn’t that have some bearing on the epistemic 
rationality of Bill’s normative judgment about whether to lie? 
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Our response is two-fold. First, the objection assumes both the Enkratic 
Principle and the top-down approach. If we reject one or both of these, the objection 
loses its force. We think that the worst view to take here is one that combines the 
Enkratic Principle with the top-down approach. Let’s suppose the Enkratic Principle is 
true. We see no good reason to prefer a view on which the epistemic merits of Bill’s 
belief, such as they are, shield him from criticism for his deeds to a view on which we 
appeal to the normative standards that Bill tries to get right in criticizing him for both 
his actions and the attitudes that rationalized them. It may be helpful here to think 
about emotion and another of Rosen’s baddies. Smith is Rosen’s sexist American 
father of the 1950s. Smith treats his sons and daughters differently, encouraging his 
sons to pursue their education, let’s say, but not his daughters ‘because they’re girls’ 
(2003: 67). Suppose his daughters protest the unequal treatment, and leave home go to 
University and Smith gets upset in turn. This kind of emotional response might well 
mesh with his outlook: he may be upset because he mistakenly thinks that his 
daughters are doing a terrible job doing what they should do. What should we say 
about his emotional response to the situation? The things that upset him are the very 
things that show that his daughters’ lives are going well and which make them happy 
and their lives meaningful. We don’t think that it’s a datum that his emotional response 
is reasonable, nor that we shouldn’t blame him for his reprehensible emotional 
responses to his daughters’ flourishing. Either there is no principle like the Enkratic 
Principle that links the reasonableness of emotional responses to judgments about how 
one should feel about things, or there is such a principle but the very things that make 
Smith’s emotional responses unreasonable threaten to show that his moral appraisals 
are equally unreasonable. 
Second, our suggestion is that, even if theoretical rationality is essentially no 
more than procedural rationality, practical rationality is not.23 Failures of practical 
rationality are not limited to failures to be thoughtful, reflective and curious about 
one’s moral beliefs and values or about what follows from them: they include also 
failures to be aware of the relevant moral facts or properly to appreciate their weight in 
                                                        
23 If we were forced to say that theoretical rationality is essentially a matter of procedural 
rationality, this response would force us to abandon the Enkratic Principle, but we see no good 
reason to think that it is. 
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various circumstances. Rosen disagrees and says that, in his example, Bill’s wife ought 
to judge that his lie ‘was a perfect manifestation of practical rationality’ because 
‘through no fault of his own he found himself believing that all things considered, he 
should lie’ since he believed ‘that in the circumstances, his selfish interests were more 
important than my [his wife’s] moral interests’ (2004: 306). 
 We maintain that Bill’s action was not a perfect manifestation of practical 
rationality. It was a rather imperfect manifestation of such rationality because in acting 
as he did he didn’t act well. To be sure, he acted in a way that was consistent with his 
values and with the judgements derived from those values, so that he was procedurally 
practically rational, both in his judgement about what to do and in his action. But his 
judgement was mistaken because he failed to appreciate that what he had been taught 
about the importance of morality was wrong. That failure led him to conclude that he 
ought to place his selfish interests before his wife’s and that was a failure to appreciate 
the relevant moral facts, that in this case constituted a failure of substantive practical 
rationality.  
 This conception of substantive practical rationality has its roots in Aristotle 
and it has been defended recently by, among others, Warren Quinn and Philippa Foot. 
Quinn conceives of practical reason as having as its ‘primary job the correct evaluation 
of ends, actions, and qualities as good and bad in themselves… To the extent that one 
realizes or serves some such good one acts well. To the extent that one realizes or 
serves some such bad one acts badly’ (1993: 30). And he adds: 
 
On my view, the only proper ground for claiming that a quality is rational to 
have or an action rational to do is that the quality or action is, on the whole, 
good. (1993: 46) 
 
Accordingly, one does not exemplify perfect substantive practical rationality if, like 
Bill, one is mistaken in one’s evaluation of whether in doing something – say tell a 
self-serving lie – one would be acting well. 
 This may seem an excessively substantive and ambitious conception of 
practical rationality and one may question why we should accept it. That challenge 
cannot be properly addressed here but we think that it can be partly met, or at least and 
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indication of how it could be met can be provided, by reminding ourselves of Philippa 
Foot’s rendering of Quinn’s central insight: 
 
We think of practical rationality as a kind of master virtue. But what would be 
so important about it if it would license or even mandate disgraceful actions? 
How in such a case could it keep its supposed status as the master virtue? Why 
should its criteria have to be met in a satisfactory theory of moral virtue? 
(2004: 5) 
 
In other words, if practical rationality is not action-guiding in this substantive (moral) 
way, why should we care much about being practically rational? One might respond 
that we should care about being practically rational because it is the most promising 
way of realising our most cherished projects, values and desires. There are two things 
to say about this response. One is that that may indeed be a reason why we should care 
about being practically rational but it need not be the only one. The other is that, our 
most cherished projects and values may be themselves irrational or unreasonable and, 
as it has been plausibly argued, if we have no good reasons to pursue our projects and 
values then we cannot have good reasons to do what would lead to their realisation, so 
mere procedural practical rationality cannot sustain our concern to be practically 
rational.24 
Our view seemed to have the undesirable consequence that an agent can 
legitimately be criticized for doing what was rational or reasonable for him to do. Our 
response is that the objection depends on a conception of practical rationality (mere 
procedural rationality) that we regard as too limited to do all the work that the notion 
of practical rationality can plausibly be called to do. And, given this richer conception 
of practical rationality, it is not obvious that our view implies that an agent can 
legitimately be criticised for doing what was practically rational for him to do. It does 
imply that an agent can legitimately be criticised for doing what was merely 
procedurally practically rational for him to do not but we regard that as a defect of our 
account.  
                                                        
24 For discussion of these issues, see Quinn (1993), Korsgaard (1997) and Raz (2005). 
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 There are two further possible objections to our view that we can envisage. 
One is that our position violates the principle that moral responsibility requires control. 
For it seems that we don’t have control over whether we have the required moral 
knowledge, sensitivity, acumen, insight, etc., and yet we claim that we are typically 
blameworthy for our normative mistakes or ignorance and for the wrong actions that 
flow from them. We deny that we lack the requisite control over whether we have the 
required moral knowledge.25 In general, most adult human beings have the capacity 
and opportunity for moral reflection to achieve the required moral knowledge to guide 
them in most of their actions (and, as we said above and Harman stresses, they also 
have an obligation to do so).26 Whatever Bill was taught as a child about the 
importance of one’s selfish interests, if we presume that Bill is a normal human adult, 
he will have reached the intellectual maturity required to be able to realise that it is 
morally wrong to, as a matter of principle, place one’s selfish interests over the 
legitimate interests of others.27  
 The second objection relates to the remarks about Bill’s ability. What does our 
position say about someone who simply cannot know the relevant moral facts, or 
appreciate their relative importance in different circumstances? After all, we must 
admit that some people are very poorly equipped to do so, if at all, perhaps because 
they were exposed to extreme forms of abuse and brutality that destroyed or 
thoroughly distorted their capacity for moral thinking,28 or because they have limited 
                                                        
25 Some writers might distinguish control, whether voluntary or not, from influence here and 
insist that we have indirect influence over our beliefs, but not control. We think such influence 
is all that is required. 
26 The same is not true for non-moral facts: we don’t always have the ability or obligation to 
know all the non-moral facts that determine whether, in the particular circumstances in which 
we find ourselves, phi-ing would amount to wrongdoing.  
27 So we worry about the precise statement of control conditions for reasons discussed above in 
connection to Zimmerman’s argument. There are some cases in which it seems that we should 
all agree that an agent’s culpability for acting in ignorance does not trace back to some case of 
clear-eyed akrasia. 
28 We are assuming extreme cases that impair one’s capacity for moral thinking and people who 
just receive poor or defective moral education are may or may not fall into this category. The 
suggestion is consistent with the thought that people with higher and better attuned capacities, 
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intellectual capacities, or because of ‘an undetected brain anomaly or the like—some 
blameless condition’ (Rosen 2004, 305). Our response is that those people are not 
exculpated from their moral obligations by their moral ignorance; rather, they are not 
subjects of the obligations in the first place.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Ignorance and mistaken belief are often perfectly good excuses. It seems plausible to 
think that they are so whenever the ignorance or the mistaken belief is non-culpable. 
The plausibility of the thought evaporates, however, if we get the standards for 
culpability for ignorance or mistaken beliefs wrong. We have argued that we get them 
wrong if we think, as Zimmerman and Rosen do, that culpability requires an instance 
of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s 
obligations. We have also argued that this mistake may be encouraged by linking the 
question about culpability for epistemic imperfections to an anaemic notion of practical 
rationality (i.e., one that reduces practical rationality to some procedural notion), both 
in judgement and action. We have argued that there is no reason to think that a 
plausible answer about culpability and excuse for wrongdoing can be guided by claims 
about rationality that rely on that anaemic conception of practical rationality.  
So we hope to have shown that ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often 
perfectly good excuses – but far less often than our opponents claim.29 
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